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Most amputees experience phantom limb, whereby they feel that the amputated limb
is still present. In some cases, these experiences include pain that can be alleviated
by “mirror therapy.” Mirror therapy consists of superimposing a mirrored image of the
moving intact limb onto the phantom limb. This therapy provides a closed loop between
the motor command to the amputated limb and its predicted visual feedback. This loop
is also involved in the sense of agency, a feeling of controlling one’s own body. However,
it is unclear how mirror therapy is related to the sense of agency over a phantom limb.
Using mirror therapy, we investigated phantom limb pain and the senses of agency
and ownership (i.e., a feeling of having one’s own body) of the phantom limb. Nine
upper-limb amputees, five of whom reported recent phantom limb pain, underwent a
single 15-min trial of mirror therapy. Before and after the trial, the participants completed
a questionnaire regarding agency, ownership, and pain related to their phantom limb.
They reported that the sense of agency over the phantom limb increased following
the mirror therapy trial, while the ownership slightly increased but not as much as did
the agency. The reported pain did not change; that is, it was comparably mild before
and after the trial. These results suggest that short-term mirror therapy can, at least
transiently, selectively enhance the sense of agency over a phantom limb, but may not
alleviate phantom limb pain.
Keywords: amputation, phantom limb, mirrored visual feedback, sensorimotor and multisensory integration,
agency, ownership, pain
INTRODUCTION
Following limb amputation due to trauma and disease, more than 90% of amputees experience
a phantom limb, whereby they continue to feel the amputated limb (Ramachandran and
Hirstein, 1998). Phantom limb often entails non-painful sensations such as position sense,
touch, warmth, and coldness. In some cases, movement of the phantom limb can be voluntarily
controlled, in distinction from motor imagery (Franz and Ramachandran, 1998; Raffin et al.,
2012a). Approximately 40–80% of amputees suffer from chronic pain of the phantom limb
Abbreviations: BF, Bayes factor; SD, standard deviation; SDS, Self-Rating Depression Scale; SPQ-B, Schizotypal Personality
Questionnaire Brief.
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(Kooijman et al., 2000; Hanley et al., 2009). The pain is frequently
described as a burning, tingling, and cramping sensation
(Sherman et al., 1989). Furthermore, 70% of amputees can
perceive phantom limb pain even 26 years after the amputation
occurred (Sherman et al., 1984). Phantom limb pain is thought
to accompany reorganization of the primary somatosensory
and motor cortices due to loss of the afferent inputs from
the amputated limb (Flor et al., 2006). A recent alternative
view suggested that the pain might be due to a preserved
representation in the sensorimotor cortices corresponding to the
amputated limb (Flor et al., 2013; Makin et al., 2013). Amputees
who have paralysis or spasm of their phantom limb and cannot
voluntarily move it are more likely to experience phantom limb
pain (Ramachandran et al., 1995; Ramachandran and Rogers-
Ramachandran, 1996). In contrast, those who can voluntarily
move their phantom limb to a greater extent usually experience
less phantom limb pain (Osumi et al., 2015; Kikkert et al., 2017).
It is conceivable that the restoration of voluntary movement
to the paralyzed phantom limb could alleviate phantom limb
pain. Indeed, “mirror therapy,” which provides mirrored visual
feedback from the phantom limb to allow voluntary movement,
has been administered for upper and lower phantom limb
pain (Ramachandran et al., 1995; Ramachandran and Rogers-
Ramachandran, 1996; Chan et al., 2007; Sumitani et al., 2008).
In mirror therapy, amputees place their intact limb in front
of a vertical mirror, which is aligned with their sagittal
plane. They place their amputated limb behind the mirror.
They then perform movements using the intact limb while
looking into the mirror. During this performance, amputees
intentionally superimpose the intact-limb movement observed in
the mirror onto their phantom limb. Following mirror therapy,
some amputees acquire voluntary movement of their phantom
limb and/or experience the alleviation of the phantom limb
pain (Ramachandran et al., 1995; Ramachandran and Rogers-
Ramachandran, 1996) even following short periods of 10–15 min
(Cole et al., 2009; Osumi et al., 2017). It is believed that the
analgesic effect of mirror therapy is due to restoration of the
appropriate sensorimotor closed loop and multisensory, visuo-
proprioceptive integration (Harris, 1999; Sumitani et al., 2008).
In other words, the incongruence between motor commands
to the amputated limb and the visuo-proprioceptive feedbacks
predicted by sensorimotor brain circuits is compensated by the
additional visual feedback of a mirrored image of the intact limb
(Ramachandran and Altschuler, 2009; Moseley and Flor, 2012;
Bolognini et al., 2015). Potentially, another effect of mirrored
visual feedback may underlie mirror therapy. Studies of healthy
individuals have shown that the perceived position of their hand
hidden behind a mirror can be biased by the position of the
contralateral hand seen in the mirror, suggesting a dominant
effect of visual information on proprioception (Holmes et al.,
2004; Holmes et al., 2006). Moreover, judgments of kinesthetic
states about the observer’s hand behind a mirror can also be
biased by the movements of the contralateral hand seen in
the mirror (Romano et al., 2013) accompanied by increased
excitability of the primary motor cortex corresponding to the
hidden hand (Garry et al., 2005; Funase et al., 2007; Touzalin-
Chretien et al., 2010). These findings imply that mirrored visual
feedback may play a role in motor and proprioceptive processing
relating to the phantom limb. For amputees, due to the lack of an
effector, no visual feedback occurs following motor commands
to the amputated limb. If a mirror is used, the mirrored visual
feedback can be obtained for the predicted location of the
phantom limb. On the basis of this idea, recent studies have
developed an alternative version of mirror therapy, using a
virtual hand. A video projection of the moving, intact limb is
superimposed onto the contralateral phantom limb, serving as
another type of mirrored visual feedback (Giraux and Sirigu,
2003; Mercier and Sirigu, 2009). Immersive virtual reality has also
been used; in this, the kinematics of the intact limb are used to
create a virtual movement of the phantom limb in an immersive,
virtual environment (Murray et al., 2007; Cole et al., 2009; Osumi
et al., 2017).
A previous study found that by using video mirror therapy,
they could reduce pain in the phantom limb and restore
activation of the primary motor cortex corresponding to the
amputated limb (Giraux and Sirigu, 2003). This suggested that
the link between movement of the phantom limb and the
alleviation of its pain is associated with motor cortex activity. This
notion is supported by the recent finding that the activation of the
motor cortex by anodal transcranial direct current stimulation
resulted in a transient relief of phantom limb pain (Bolognini
et al., 2013). Although these findings support the notion that
voluntary movement of the phantom limb is a crucial factor
for the alleviation of phantom limb pain, it has been suggested
that the reduction of the phantom limb pain also requires the
subjective feeling of control over the phantom limb, that is, a
sense of agency over the phantom limb (Cole et al., 2009). In line
with this suggestion, a therapy using a virtual hand, generated
by the electromyographic activity of the stump muscles, was
found to have an analgesic effect (Ortiz-Catalan et al., 2014). In
this therapy, amputees both control their stump muscles and
develop simultaneous phantom limb movement. Therefore, the
sensorimotor loop for the amputated limb is corrected and a
feeling of control is generated (via the stump muscles) resulting
in the alleviation of the phantom limb pain.
Recent observations in cognitive neuroscience have posited
that our bodily sense of self, except for that entailing
temporal extension (e.g., self-identity), consists of the senses
of agency and ownership (Gallagher, 2000). The senses of
agency and ownership are based on different intersensory and/or
sensorimotor mechanisms and are implemented by distinct
brain circuits (Tsakiris et al., 2010b). The sense of agency, a
feeling of controlling one’s own body, is considered to be a
fundamental mental process involved in the appropriate motor
control. The internal forward model of the sensorimotor system,
which includes sensorimotor prediction and the congruence
between predicted and incoming sensory feedbacks, enables
optimal motor learning and control (Wolpert et al., 1995; Miall
and Wolpert, 1996; Wolpert et al., 2011). It also creates the
subjective experience of the sense of agency (Frith et al., 2000;
Haggard, 2017). This model is based on an efference copy, which
is generated as a copy of motor commands from an intended
action and predicts sensory (e.g., visual) feedback corresponding
to the motor commands before the actual sensory feedback. If the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 October 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 483
fnhum-11-00483 October 4, 2017 Time: 10:55 # 3
Imaizumi et al. Mirror Therapy Enhances Agency
prediction spatio-temporally matches the actual feedback, a sense
of agency will be generated. These mechanisms also underlie the
sense of agency over a phantom limb. It has been shown that
temporally incongruent mirrored visual feedback from intended
phantom limb movements can decrease the sense of agency
and the corresponding electromyographic activity in the stump
muscles (Imaizumi et al., 2014). The sense of ownership refers
to a feeling of having one’s own body, i.e., self-attribution of
physical and fake body parts and phantom limbs (Lenggenhager
et al., 2014), and is generated through multisensory afferences,
such as visuo-tactile inputs (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Kilteni
et al., 2015). This notion has been supported by studies using
the “rubber hand illusion,” in which observers watch an artificial
hand being stroked while their own unseen hand is being
synchronously stroked for a short period, and they start to feel a
sense of ownership over the artificial hand (Botvinick and Cohen,
1998).
Although the senses of agency and ownership are conceptually
and neurally distinctive, they are also tightly interwoven.
Correlation between senses of agency and ownership has been
revealed by a visuomotor version of the rubber hand illusion,
in which an artificial hand moves in synchrony with the active
movements of the observers’ own hand (Kalckert and Ehrsson,
2012, 2014a). In the visuomotor rubber hand illusion, active
movements generate predictions of visual and somatosensory
afferences according to the internal models for the movements.
When the predicted afferences are available (i.e., a synchronously
moving fake hand), both senses of agency and ownership can
emerge. Importantly, studies using the visuomotor rubber hand
illusion have also revealed that a sense of agency can even elicit a
sense of ownership over a proxy of one’s own body parts (Tsakiris
et al., 2006; Asai, 2016) and is responsible for coherence of the
sense of ownership (Tsakiris et al., 2006). This suggests that
the sense of agency is dominant over the sense of ownership.
Nevertheless, we should point out the opposite, that is, the
possibility that ownership elicits agency. For example, a study
has shown that the visuotactile rubber hand illusion without
observers’ active movements can induce a sense of agency over
the fake hand to some extent (Tsakiris et al., 2010a), implying that
the ownership itself may induce the agency. Yet, in some other
studies, the visuotactile rubber hand illusion did not induce the
agency while inducing the ownership (Longo et al., 2008; Kalckert
and Ehrsson, 2014a,b). Given this contradiction, although the
potential bidirectional relationship between senses of agency and
ownership should be acknowledged, this study adopted the stance
that a sense of agency can elicit a sense of ownership (i.e., agency
dominant over ownership).
A series of studies have shown that the restored sensorimotor
loop involving the phantom limb leads to the acquisition
of voluntary phantom limb movements and the alleviation
of phantom limb pain (e.g., Ramachandran and Rogers-
Ramachandran, 1996), implying a potential relationship between
sense of agency and the phantom limb pain. On the other hand,
it is possible that a sense of ownership may also reduce the
phantom limb pain. Vision of one’s own body can decrease
subjective pain and pain-related brain responses relative to the
vision of another person’s body or an object; this effect is
known as “visual analgesia” (Longo et al., 2009). Importantly,
the visual analgesia requires a sense of ownership over what
the observer views, e.g., one’s physical body (Longo et al., 2009)
or a fake body after manipulation using visuotactile stimulation
(Hansel et al., 2011; Martini et al., 2014; Romano et al., 2014b).
Furthermore, patients complaining about disownership of their
limbs (i.e., somatoparaphrenia, body integrity identity disorder)
can show reduced responses to painful stimuli to the affected
limbs without a sense of ownership (Romano et al., 2014a,
2015). These findings imply that a sense of ownership modulates
pain perception, and that in mirror therapy, ownership over
the phantom limb might also modulate phantom limb pain.
However, whether and how the closed sensorimotor loop
produced by mirror therapy can influence agency and ownership
over the phantom limb, and how they can modulate phantom
limb pain, remain unclear. Further analysis of the subjective
experiences felt in a phantom limb during neurorehabilitation
(e.g., mirror therapy) may provide a deeper understanding of the
phenomenal and sensorimotor mechanisms behind the phantom
limb and the origin of the analgesic effect of mirror therapy.
The current study had three aims. The first was to examine
whether and how the senses of agency and ownership over a
phantom limb were modulated by mirror therapy. The second
was to check if the phantom limb pain was alleviated by the
mirror therapy. Finally, we aimed to examine the relationship
between the agency, ownership, and phantom limb pain. To this
end, we recruited nine upper-limb amputees and administered a
questionnaire that measured the senses of agency and ownership
over phantom limb and the phantom limb pain, before and
after a single trial of short-term mirror therapy. According to
previous studies on mirror therapy (e.g., Ramachandran and
Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996), it was expected that following our
mirror therapy, the sense of agency over the phantom limb would
be enhanced and the phantom limb pain would be alleviated.
We also expected a positive correlation between agency and
ownership (e.g., Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012), and a correlation
between the enhanced agency and the alleviated pain (e.g., Cole
et al., 2009).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Nine Japanese adults with an upper-limb amputation (all males;
mean age 64.78 years, SD = 12.21; range 46–80 years; all
right-handed) participated in return for monetary compensation
(Table 1). All participants reported that they perceived a phantom
limb and were able to voluntarily move it to a varying degree. Five
of them reported their recent experience of phantom limb pain.
Each amputation occurred an average of 39.87 years (SD= 16.33)
before the current study. None of the participants was receiving
current medical treatment for the pain from their phantom
limb and stump. They reported good health other than their
amputation, and were able to perform everyday manual tasks
by themselves with or without their prosthetic arm. Participants
were recruited from the Seibu College of Medical Technology,
Tokyo, Japan. Given our position and resources, we were limited
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to this sample size. All the participants (except for the last patient
indicated in Table 1) had participated in our previous study
(Imaizumi et al., 2016) that examined the effect of the fitting
of an (un)embodied prosthetic arm on postural stability during
quiet standing. Thus, although some of their demographic and
clinical information has already been reported, the purposes,
experiments, and findings of our previous work are differentiated
from the current study that examined the effect of mirror
therapy on the senses of agency and ownership over a phantom
limb and phantom limb pain. This study was carried out in
accordance with the recommendations of the ethical committee
of the Graduate School of Engineering, Chiba University with
written informed consent from all subjects. All subjects gave
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki. The protocol was approved by the ethical committee of
the Graduate School of Engineering, Chiba University (approval
number: 26–32).
Because this study aimed to examine the effect of mirror
therapy on the agency and ownership over phantom limb and
phantom limb pain, other potential factors that may affect
them should be controlled. Hence, the following three indices
were measured prior to the experiment. To ensure that the
participants were normal in terms of depression (Gentsch and
Synofzik, 2014) and schizophrenia (Waters et al., 2012; Hur
et al., 2014), which are likely to disturb the sense of agency, the
participants completed the SDS (Zung, 1965) and the SPQ-B
(Raine and Benishay, 1995) prior to the main experiment. The
SDS consists of 20 items using a four-point scale (ranging
from 1 to 4) to measure depressive symptoms. An SDS score
less than 50 indicates that the respondent is non-depressive.
The SPQ-B consists of 22 items using a dichotomous scale
(0 or 1) to measure schizotypal personality traits. An SPQ-B
score less than 17 indicates a normal level of schizotypy. We
used the validated Japanese versions of the SDS (Fukuda and
Kobayashi, 1973) and SPQ-B (Ito et al., 2008). None of the
participants was found to have noticeable depressive traits or
schizotypal personality (SDS ≤ 48; SPQ-B ≤ 14; see Table 1
for individual data). Additionally, we conducted a follow-up
study with age- and sex-matched healthy controls [nine males;
mean age 66.89 years, SD = 9.70; comparison with amputees’
age: Bayes factor (BF10) = 0.344 calculated by a Bayesian test
for unpaired data, for details see section “Data Analysis”]. The
controls gave written informed consent and participated in return
for monetary compensation. They completed the SDS and SPQ-
B, and all responses were below the aforementioned cutoff scores
and comparable with the amputees’ responses (SDS: amputees’
mean [SD] = 41.11 [6.29]; controls’ mean [SD] = 39.67 [6.00];
BF10 = 0.355; SPQ-B: amputees’ mean [SD] = 5.33 [4.15];
controls’ mean [SD]= 3.89 [3.02]; BF10 = 0.427).
Finally, to ensure that the amputees had a normal level
of interoceptive accuracy (i.e., accuracy of perceiving visceral
states), which can alter sense of ownership over one’s body
parts (Tsakiris et al., 2011), as well as pain threshold and
tolerance (Pollatos et al., 2012), all of the participants performed
a heartbeat counting task (Schandry, 1981) prior to the main
experiment. The task procedure and data handling was in line
with previous studies (Pollatos et al., 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2011).
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The participants’ heartbeats were monitored with an infrared
pulse oximeter (Pulxy plus EC100F, Try and E Corporation,
Kobe, Japan) attached to tip of the index finger of amputees’
intact hand or to the controls’ non-dominant hand. In each
trial, participants started silently counting their own heartbeats
on a verbal cue, until they received a verbal “stop” cue. After
a practice trial of 15 s, the main trials consisted of intervals of
25, 35, 45, and 100 s and were performed in a pseudo-random
order. Participants were asked to verbally report the number of
counted heartbeats at the end of each interval. Throughout the
trials, participants were asked not to take their pulse by touching
any body parts, and did not receive any feedback about the trial
length or their performance. The interoceptive accuracy score
was computed according to the following formula:
1
4
∑
(1− (|recorded heartbeats− counted heartbeats|)
/recorded heartbeats)
A higher score indicated a higher interoceptive accuracy. As a
result, the amputees showed a comparable level of interoceptive
accuracy to the healthy controls (amputees’ mean [SD] = 0.790
[0.138]; controls’ mean [SD] = 0.780 [0.187]; BF10 = 0.324, see
Table 1 for amputees’ individual data). Responses from both
amputees and controls were considered to be comparable to the
mean score of 0.77 (SD= 0.14) previously measured in 28 healthy
students (Pollatos et al., 2008).
Measures
We used a questionnaire to measure subjective experiences
of the senses of agency and ownership over phantom limb
and phantom limb pain before and after short-term mirror
therapy, as previously used in studies on the rubber hand illusion
(e.g., Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012). This questionnaire consisted
of eight items rated on a five-point scale as described in Table 2.
These items were answered in a setting in which the participants
could not observe a mirror or wear their prosthetic arm, in
order to evaluate the current sensations from their phantom limb.
Items 1, 2, and 3 addressed the sense of ownership over phantom
limb, including how the phantom limb is subjectively present
and incorporated into one’s body representation, and whether it
had bodily shape. These experiences have been previously used
to describe a sense of ownership over a phantom limb (Otsuka,
1968; Melzack, 1990) as well as a physical limb (Kalckert and
Ehrsson, 2012; Guterstam et al., 2013). Items 4, 5, and 6 addressed
the sense of agency over phantom limb, that is, to what extent
participants were able to control their phantom limb, in terms of
quickness, accuracy, and difficulty. Note that the items 2, 4, 5, and
6 were modified from a previous questionnaire which assessed the
sense of agency and ownership over a prosthetic arm (Imaizumi
et al., 2016). According to previous psychometric studies (Longo
et al., 2008), we investigated the subjective experience of phantom
limb, in terms of agency and ownership, by analyzing composite
variables (i.e., factors) regarding these senses. We thus averaged
items 1–3 into the composite variable Ownership, and items
4–6 into the composite variable Agency. Items 7 and 8 assessed
the pain from the phantom limb in terms of its intensity
and unpleasantness, according to a traditional measurement for
phantom limb pain (MacIver et al., 2008). These results were
averaged into the composite variable Pain.
Procedures
A briefing was conducted in a group setting before the mirror-
therapy trial. After written informed consent was obtained,
the experimenters (i.e., the present authors) interviewed the
participants with regard to demographic information, history of
their amputation, and the sensations of their phantom limb. The
participants were then asked to complete the SDS and SPQ-B.
Then, participants were individually invited to a quiet well-lit
booth to perform the heartbeat counting task.
The mirror-therapy trial was conducted individually in a
well-lit room. Participants removed their prosthetic arm and/or
wrist ornaments and were seated on a comfortable chair in
front of a table. A portable glass mirror (267 mm × 368 mm)
was vertically placed on the table and aligned with the
participants’ mid-sagittal plane. The participants completed the
questionnaire on their awareness of phantom limb (see section
“Measures”) without vision of the mirror. After the experimenters
described and demonstrated the mirror therapy procedure to
the participants, they placed their intact hand in front of the
mirror and their amputated limb behind the mirror. They
then performed movements of the intact limb, while looking
into the mirror. Movements included: moving the intact hand
toward or away from the mirror; moving it forward or backward
along the sagittal plane; and opening and closing the fingers,
without touching the mirror. The participants were instructed to
TABLE 2 | Questionnaire on the senses of agency and ownership over the phantom limb and phantom limb pain.
Items Five-point scales
(1) Presence: How vividly do you find the presence of your phantom limb? 1: Not at all. 5: Vivid as intact side.
(2) Incorporation: To what extent do you feel that your phantom limb is a part of your body? 1: Not at all. 5: Entirely.
(3) Bodily shape: To what extent do you find your phantom limb shaped like a hand and an arm? 1: Not at all. 5: Entirely.
(4) Quickness: How quickly do you move your phantom limb when you intend to move it? 1: Extremely slow. 5: Instantaneous.
(5) Accuracy: How accurately do you move your phantom limb? 1: Not at all. 5: Accurate as intact side.
(6) Difficulty: How difficult is it to move your phantom limb? 1: Extremely. 5: Easy as intact side.
(7) Pain intensity: How intense is the pain from your phantom limb? 1: Not at all. 5: Extremely.
(8) Unpleasantness: To what extent do you feel your phantom limb pain unpleasant? 1: Not at all. 5: Extremely.
The titles for each item (italics) were not presented to the participants during the experiment.
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intentionally relate the intact limb movements observed in the
mirror to their phantom limb. The speed and range of intact
limb movements varied among the participants so that they
could synchronously and comfortably couple their phantom limb
movements with the intact limb movements (Griffin et al., 2017).
For the same reason, the order and frequency of the movements
also varied among the participants (Foell et al., 2014). The trial
lasted for approximately 15 min. This duration was determined
based on previous studies that examined the analgesic effect of
short-term mirror therapy, using an immersive virtual reality
(Cole et al., 2009; Osumi et al., 2017), and in order to avoid an
excessive burden on the elderly participants. Immediately after
the trial, the mirror was removed, and the participants completed
the questionnaire on their phantom limb awareness in reference
to current sensations from their phantom limb.
Data Analysis
In order to assess the internal consistencies of the three composite
variables (i.e., Ownership, Agency, and Pain), Cronbach’s alpha
(Cronbach, 1951) for each of the composites was calculated
separately for responses before and after the mirror therapy trial.
Next, in order to examine the differences in the three composite
variables before and after the mirror therapy trial, we performed
Bayesian hypothesis testing for the mean difference between
pairs of observations (Rouder et al., 2009) by quantifying the
evidence of an alternative hypothesis (i.e., there is a difference
between before and after the trial) and its null hypothesis.
We also described the Bayesian analyses for differences in
each single item between before and after the trial. The Bayes
factor (BF10) was reported as a result of Bayesian analysis. For
example, a BF10 of 5 indicates that the observed data are 5
times more likely to occur under the alternative hypothesis than
under the null hypothesis. We interpreted BF10 larger than 3
as substantial evidence for the alternative hypothesis relative to
the null hypothesis, BF10 between 1 and 3 as weak evidence for
the alternative hypothesis, BF10 between 0.333 and 1 as weak
evidence for the null hypothesis, and BF10 smaller than 0.333
as substantial evidence for the null hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961).
Finally, to examine correlations between the changes in the three
composite variables, we performed Bayesian rank correlation
analysis using Kendall’s tau (van Doorn et al., in press) for
the differentials of the three composite variables between before
and after the mirror therapy trial (i.e., subtraction of the pre
value from the post value). For this correlation, we reported
the correlation coefficients tau (τ) and BF10 with an alternative
hypothesis postulating that the two variables were correlated.
Bayesian analyses were performed with the Cauchy prior width
of 0.707. All analyses were conducted using JASP 0.8.1.2 (JASP
Team, 2017).
RESULTS
To begin with, we report the internal consistency of each
composite variable of the phantom limb questionnaire. Before
the trial, Cronbach’s alphas were 0.805 (Ownership), 0.944
(Agency), and 0.923 (Pain). Following the trial, alphas were 0.946
FIGURE 1 | Mean responses to composite questionnaire items representing
the sense of ownership and agency over the phantom limb and pain from the
phantom limb, averaged from the following items: Ownership, items 1, 2, and
3; Agency, items 4, 5, and 6; Pain, items 7 and 8. Orange and blue markers
indicate the responses measured before and after the trial of mirror therapy,
respectively. An asterisk indicates substantial evidence for the alternative
hypothesis postulating the difference between before and after the short-term
mirror therapy trial (∗Bayes factor > 3). Error bars denote 95% credible
interval.
(Ownership), 0.880 (Agency), and 0.759 (Pain). Therefore, the
internal consistencies of three composite variables were sufficient.
We should note that the alpha for post-trial Pain was relatively
low, perhaps due to the small number of items contributing to
the formation of the composite variable (Tavakol and Dennick,
2011).
The mean scores for the three composite variables obtained
from measurements before and after the mirror therapy trial are
displayed in Figure 1. The scores for each participant are also
summarized in Table 3. Before the trial, all participants agreed
with the Agency and Ownership composite items to varying
degrees, except for participant #1, who completely disagreed with
the Agency composite. We found that the Agency score increased
after the trial, supported by the BF10 of 3.813 that indicated
substantial evidence for the alternative hypothesis postulating
TABLE 3 | Responses to the composite items (Ownership, Agency, and Pain) from
each participant before and after the mirror therapy trial.
ID Ownership Agency Pain
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
1 3.3 3.0 1.0 3.0 1.5 1.5
2 3.3 4.7 4.0 4.7 1.0 1.0
3 4.7 5.0 5.0 5.0 1.0 2.0
4 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 2.0
5 2.7 4.3 4.3 4.7 1.0 1.0
6 4.7 5.0 3.3 5.0 1.0 1.0
7 4.0 5.0 2.0 3.3 2.0 4.0
8 4.7 5.0 4.7 4.7 4.0 3.5
9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.7 1.0 1.0
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FIGURE 2 | Mean responses to each item of the questionnaire on phantom
limb awareness and pain. Orange and blue markers indicate the responses
measured before and after the mirror therapy trial, respectively. Error bars
denote 95% credible interval.
the pre–post difference. On the other hand, there was a slight
increment of the Ownership score after the trial, supported by
the BF10 of 1.867 indicating weak evidence for the alternative
hypothesis. Furthermore, the Pain scores indicated mild levels
before and after the trial and showed almost no difference, with
a BF10 of 0.325, indicating substantial evidence for the null
hypothesis.
The mean scores for each of the single items are summarized
in Figure 2. Scores of all components of Agency (items 4–6:
Quickness, Accuracy, and Difficulty) increased after the mirror
therapy trial. These results were consistent with the effect on
the Agency composite item and may be supported by BF10s
indicating weak evidence for the alternative hypothesis (item 4:
BF10 = 1.133; item 5: BF10 = 2.856; item 6: BF10 = 1.282). As for
the Ownership composite, only the Presence (item 1) increased
after the trial with a BF10 of 2.378, indicating weak evidence
for the alternative hypothesis. The other item scores showed
slight modulations after the trial, with BF10s indicating weak
evidence for the null hypothesis (item 2: BF10 = 0.897; item 3:
BF10 = 0.340; item 7: BF10 = 0.376; item 8: BF10 = 0.333).
We found small correlation coefficients between pre–post
differentials of the three composite variables, and indeed, there
was weak evidence for the null hypothesis suggesting no
correlations: Agency and Ownership: τ = −0.123, BF10 = 0.452;
Agency and Pain: τ = 0.307, BF10 = 0.736; and Ownership and
Pain: τ= 0.277, BF10 = 0.661.
DISCUSSION
Mirror therapy provides mirrored visual feedback of voluntary
movements of an intact hand superimposed onto a phantom
limb. It has been known to restore the sensorimotor closed-
loop involving voluntary movement of a phantom limb and
can alleviate painful sensation from the phantom limb (e.g.,
Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996). The current
study examined how the senses of agency and ownership over
a phantom limb and the phantom limb pain are modulated
following approximately 15 min of mirror therapy. The subjective
reports obtained from nine upper-limb amputees who were
physically, psychiatrically, and interoceptively healthy (except
for their limb amputation), suggested that following short-term
mirror therapy, the sense of agency over the phantom limb
increased. In contrast, the sense of ownership only slightly
increased and the phantom limb pain showed almost no
change. Furthermore, there were no correlations between the
enhancement of agency and ownership and the variation of
phantom limb pain.
Sense of Agency over Phantom Limb
Enhanced by Mirror Therapy
In mirror therapy, mirrored visual feedback of an intact
limb superimposed onto a contralateral phantom limb can
complement the sensorimotor and/or multisensory integration
by matching the intended movement (or motor commands) of
the phantom limb with its predicted visual and proprioceptive
feedbacks, and consequently, may restore voluntary movement
of the phantom limb (Sumitani et al., 2008; Ramachandran and
Altschuler, 2009; Moseley and Flor, 2012; Bolognini et al., 2015).
In a similar vein, the sense of agency—that is, a subjective
feeling of voluntary control of one’s own body parts—can also
be generated by the congruence between motor prediction and
its actual sensory feedbacks based on the internal forward
model of motor control (Frith et al., 2000; Haggard, 2017).
Empirical studies have shown that manipulation of spatio-
temporal (in)congruence between voluntary movements and the
sensory (e.g., visual) feedbacks, can modulate the sense of agency
over both intact limbs (Franck et al., 2001; Asai and Tanno,
2007; Farrer et al., 2008) and phantom limbs (Imaizumi et al.,
2014). In concurrence with these principles and findings, our
results showed that short-term mirror therapy, which provided
congruency between the predicted and actual sensory feedbacks,
can increase the sense of agency over a phantom limb. The
mirrored visual feedback may enable the internal forward models
to be updated, resulting in changes in the predicted location
and movements of the missing limb, corresponding to what the
amputee observes in the mirror (Blakemore et al., 2002) and
resulting in an increased sense of agency.
Another potential explanation for the enhanced agency
following mirror therapy is the effect of mere observation of the
mirrored visual feedback on the proprioception in the amputated
side, although generating a sense of agency basically requires
motor intention and commands (Haggard, 2005). It has been
shown that the position and movements of an intact hand
observed in a mirror can bias the position sense (Holmes et al.,
2004), motor awareness (Romano et al., 2013), and motor-related
neural activities (e.g., Garry et al., 2005) of the contralateral
intact hand behind the mirror. Thus, it might be possible
that a mirrored image of the moving intact limb during our
mirror therapy promoted the proprioception of kinematics of the
phantom limb and the neural activity related to phantom limb
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movements, resulting in the enhancement of the sense of agency.
Nevertheless, further investigation is needed to clarify whether
and to what extent the mere observation of a mirrored image, as
well as the restoration of the sensorimotor integration, play a role
in the enhancement of agency through mirror therapy.
Previous studies have demonstrated that mirror therapy can
increase the mobility and controllability of phantom upper-
limbs (Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996; Mercier
and Sirigu, 2009) and lower-limbs (Brodie et al., 2003, 2007).
This is supported by neural evidence showing an increase
in activation of the primary motor cortex during the motor
execution with phantom limbs (Giraux and Sirigu, 2003; Raffin
et al., 2012b). Although we did not provide any data suggesting a
neural underpinning of agency enhanced by mirror therapy, our
findings suggest that the restored voluntary movements of the
phantom limb entail an awareness of one’s own action (i.e., sense
of agency), and might offer a new perspective on the motor
functions of the phantom limb.
Recently, new interventions using virtual immersive
reality and augmented reality have been developed and
evaluated as an alternative to mirror therapy (Alphonso et al.,
2012; Ortiz-Catalan et al., 2014, 2016). In these techniques,
electromyographic activity of the stump muscles is recorded and
concurrently transformed into movements of a virtual hand,
which are displayed on a monitor in front of the amputees. Thus,
amputees can directly control the virtual hand in a manner
that corresponds not only to stump electromyographic activity,
but also to phantom limb movements; therefore, they may be
more likely to perceive a sense of agency. In line with this, the
electromyographic activity of stump muscles is correlated with
subjective reports of a sense of agency over the phantom limb
(Imaizumi et al., 2014). In mirror therapy, amputees are required
to match their phantom limb with the moving intact hand seen
in a mirror, or in other words, to simply imitate the observed
image in the mirror. We speculate that, in this situation, the sense
of agency over the phantom limb may be less likely to emerge
than in the virtual hand therapies, which require controlling the
phantom limb and/or virtual hand. Further investigations on the
differences in generating a sense of agency between controlling
and imitating a proxy of phantom limb (i.e., virtual-hand and
mirror therapies, respectively) are required and might have
implications for the future of neurorehabilitation for phantom
limbs.
Agency Dominant over Ownership
This short-term mirror therapy trial led to a substantial
enhancement of the sense of agency over the phantom limb,
but only a slight increase in the sense of ownership. Although
controlling what you do not have may appear to be paradoxical, it
is plausible as agency and ownership are generated from distinct
sensorimotor and neural mechanisms (Tsakiris, 2010; Tsakiris
et al., 2010b), and are phenomenally and behaviorally dissociable
(Gallagher, 2000; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012). An artificial object
can be incorporated into one’s own body representation in two
ways. The first way is based on afferent intersensory signals.
For instance, continuous visuotactile stimulation onto a rubber
hand can result in the illusory ownership over it as one’s own
body part (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). In this situation, a sense
of ownership is likely to be perceived. On the other hand, a
proxy of one’s effector (e.g., tool) is also likely to be incorporated
into body representation (Maravita and Iriki, 2004) and entail
sense of agency (Imaizumi et al., 2016) following motor learning
and internal model updates due to a continuous voluntary
use of it. When considering the means by which a phantom
limb is embodied, voluntary control of phantom limb, acquired
through mirror therapy, can involve a closed-loop between motor
commands and the concurrent sensory feedback. This potentially
updates the internal forward models, wherein the sense of agency
over the phantom limb is more likely to be experienced than the
sense of ownership over it. This notion is supported by previous
empirical findings, which suggest that the sense of agency over a
proxy of one’s own body parts is dominant and can lead to a sense
of ownership over the proxy (Tsakiris et al., 2006; Asai, 2016).
Amputees are differentiated based not only on whether
they experience their missing limb as a phantom limb, but
also on the usage of a prosthetic limb. Phantom limb can
emerge from reorganized or residual sensorimotor cortical
representation after amputation (Flor et al., 2013) and is a brain-
based, non-physical subjective body with phenomenal vividness.
Clinical interventions such as mirror therapy can enable the
acquisition of voluntary control of the phantom limb, through
a restoration of the sensorimotor closed loop, which includes
the predicted state of the phantom limb and its corresponding
mirrored visual feedbacks. This may update the forward models
of motor control (Blakemore et al., 2002). On the other hand,
a prosthetic limb is an artificial tool, attached as an alternative
to the missing limb. However, long-term use of the prosthetic
limb can result in the incorporation of the prosthesis into the
amputees’ own body, by updating the internal forward models
(Wolpert et al., 1995; Miall and Wolpert, 1996). Amputees
who frequently use their prosthetic arm have been shown to
overestimate the length of their amputated limb, toward the tip
of prosthetic arm (McDonnell et al., 1989). They may also show
an extension of the peripersonal space, toward the prosthetic arm
(Canzoneri et al., 2013), and stabilized postural control when
wearing the prosthetic arm (Imaizumi et al., 2016). Importantly,
a recent study showed that amputees who frequently use their
prosthetic arm perceive a stronger sense of agency over the
prosthesis than those who rarely use it, but no such difference was
observed for the sense of ownership (Imaizumi et al., 2016). These
previous results and the present findings suggest that the sense of
agency may be dominant over the sense of ownership, with regard
to both phantom limbs and embodied prosthetic limbs. On the
other hand, our follow-up analysis showed that the frequency
of prosthetic arm use (see Table 1) scarcely correlated with the
pre-score and pre–post differential score on the composite and
single items regarding agency and ownership over the phantom
limb (|τ| s≤ 0.154, BF10s≤ 0.476). This implies that there may be
no direct relationship between the embodiment of phantom and
prosthetic limbs in terms of the senses of agency and ownership.
Thus, in amputees, phantom limbs and embodied prosthetic
limbs may stem from different origins (i.e., the brain-based
subjective limb and the external tool, respectively), but these
limbs can be similarly, but independently, experienced as one’s
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 8 October 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 483
fnhum-11-00483 October 4, 2017 Time: 10:55 # 9
Imaizumi et al. Mirror Therapy Enhances Agency
body parts and can be voluntarily controlled rather than simply
owned.
Nevertheless, we should point out that, while the composite
item of Ownership slightly increased following the short-term
mirror therapy, the vividness of the presence of a phantom limb
(item 1; see Table 2) was more substantially enhanced by mirror
therapy than the Ownership composite (see section “Results”).
Therefore, it appears that while mirror therapy has only a slight
influence on the sense of ownership, it can enhance certain
subcomponents of ownership, for instance, the feeling of the
presence of one’s own body part in empty space (Guterstam
et al., 2013). Therefore, the subjective bodily experiences of
phantom limb may be examined in terms not only of the
two main components (i.e., agency and ownership), but also of
their subcomponents that can be qualitatively and quantitatively
described (Murray et al., 2007; Cole et al., 2009). Moreover,
multivariate analyses might clarify the relationships between the
subcomponents, with regard to our findings on Agency and
Presence (item 1), following modulation with mirror therapy.
However, the limited sample size of this study did not allow for
such analyses. Finally, a deeper understanding of the multifaceted
experience of phantom limb may decipher which subcomponents
can effectively strengthen the sense of agency, which has a role for
alleviating phantom limb pain (Cole et al., 2009). Consequently,
this will help to update the existing visual feedback therapies (e.g.,
the development of a new therapy to increase the accuracy of
phantom limb movements).
Potential Link between Agency,
Ownership, and Phantom Limb Pain
Our results indicated that the single mirror therapy trial
enhanced the sense of agency. However, we did not demonstrate
the alleviation of phantom limb pain, which is consistent with
a previous study using a single session of mirror therapy
(Brodie et al., 2007). Mirror therapy was originally developed to
induce voluntary movements of the phantom limb and alleviate
phantom limb pain. A number of studies have shown that mirror
therapy alleviates phantom limb pain (Ramachandran et al., 1995;
Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996; Chan et al.,
2007; Sumitani et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2009; Finn et al., 2017;
Griffin et al., 2017; Osumi et al., 2017) and that its analgesic
effects can be stronger in those who are able to perform voluntary
movements of the phantom limb to a greater extent (Sumitani
et al., 2008). However, recent systematic reviews have criticized
the inter-study heterogeneity of the analgesic effects of mirror
therapy on phantom limb pain (Rothgangel et al., 2011; Barbin
et al., 2016; Thieme et al., 2016). One plausible explanation for
this heterogeneity is a lack of consideration of the sense of agency
(Cole et al., 2009). Cole et al. (2009) conducted an experiment to
examine the analgesic effect of a virtual-reality version of mirror
therapy, in which upper- and lower-limb amputees observed a
virtual limb corresponding to the captured movements of their
stump. They found that the alleviation of phantom limb pain
was more likely to be observed in those who reported a sense
of agency over the virtual limbs. These previous results imply a
relationship between the sense of agency and its role in alleviating
phantom limb pain. However, this was not the case in our results
that showed no modulation of phantom limb pain after short-
term mirror therapy and no evidence of a correlation between
modulations in the sense of agency and phantom limb pain.
We should note, as one of our limitations, that our participants
reported relatively weak phantom limb pain even before the
mirror therapy. This might have resulted in a floor effect. Thus,
future studies should further examine whether mirror therapy has
a preferential influence on the sense of agency for amputees who
experience strong phantom limb pain.
Finally, our results showed that short-term mirror therapy
did not cause a substantial increase in the sense of ownership
over the phantom limb. In addition, there was no coincidence of
the ownership and pain modulation. Our findings were contrary
to previous findings about the “visual analgesia” induced by
vision of body parts, over which observers can perceive the
sense of ownership (Longo et al., 2009; Hansel et al., 2011;
Martini et al., 2014; Romano et al., 2014b). This might be
due to the abovementioned floor effect on the pain ratings,
but also because of the difference in the presence or absence
of voluntary bodily movements between the mirror therapy
and the experimental task used in previous studies on visual
analgesia. Mirror therapy entails the intention to move and
motor commands for the amputated site and phantom limb. To
speculate, at least for mirror therapy, voluntary movements and
related sensory signals within a closed sensorimotor loop may
have a role in generating a sense of agency, but lesser role for the
ownership given a potential agency-dominance over ownership
(see section “Agency Dominant over Ownership”).
Limitations
The current study has four limitations of note. First, our sample
size was small. Thus, future studies should replicate the present
findings with larger samples. Second, since we conducted only
a single trial of 15-min mirror therapy, our findings should be
limited to the effects specific to short-term mirror therapy. Thus,
our results showing no pain alleviation do not necessarily indicate
that mirror therapy itself is ineffective in alleviating phantom
limb pain. One might argue that long-term mirror therapy over
days and weeks can enhance the ownership over phantom limbs
and alleviate phantom limb pain, and if so, the relationships
between agency, ownership, and pain might be clarified. Indeed,
short- and long-term mirror therapies can have different effects
depending on the severity of phantom limb pain (Griffin et al.,
2017). Furthermore, contrary to the aforementioned findings
on agency over a prosthetic arm (Imaizumi et al., 2016), the
current study observed only a transient increase in the sense
of agency using short-term mirror therapy. In future studies,
continuous measurements while administering multiple sessions
of mirror therapy will help clarify variations in the sense of
agency and ownership, and phantom limb pain resulting from
mirror therapy. Third, our experiment did not include control
conditions for the intervention using the mirror therapy. Thus,
one might argue that the changes of sensations in phantom
limb are merely explained by the effect of exercise on the
movements of phantom limbs regardless of the presence of
mirrored visual feedback. A previous study that examined the
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effect of mirror therapy on the phantom limb movement and
pain (Brodie et al., 2007) suggested that an opaque, non-reflective
board should be used as a control for the mirror. In the
current study, the limited sample size did not allow us to
perform a between-participants design containing experimental
and control conditions. However, future studies with a larger
sample should be beneficial to strengthen our findings. Finally,
our questionnaire measuring agency, ownership, and pain did
not include control questions that did not directly ask about
constructs of interest. Control items can reduce response biases
and check the validity of responses to other questions. There
may be room for improvement by adding control items to our
questionnaire, like a traditional questionnaire on the rubber hand
illusion (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998).
CONCLUSION
The current study suggests that a single trial of short-term mirror
therapy has the potential to transiently enhance the sense of
agency over a phantom limb, while the sense of ownership cannot
be enhanced to the same extent as the sense of agency. We also
suggest that short-term mirror therapy may not be effective for
phantom limb pain, but long-term mirror therapy might lead
to pain alleviation as well as acquisition of a sense of agency.
Our findings may provide a new perspective on the subjective
experience of phantom limbs, and also suggest a potential
mechanism for motor recovery that is observed following mirror
therapy for phantom limb pain and other neurological conditions
that benefit from mirror therapy, such as complex regional pain
syndrome (McCabe et al., 2003) and hemiplegia (Altschuler et al.,
1999).
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